sebastian luft

• kant ile husserl arasındaki ilişkiyi anlamak adına önemli makaleler yazmaktadır. özellikle heidegger'in kendi yolunu bulmadan evvel neo-kant'çıların düşünceleri ile, özellikle aşkınsal mantık ile uğraştığını ve mantık sorunlarından sonra "anlam" sorununa kaydığını göz önüne alırsak aslında çoğu yazılmış makalenin ne kadar da felsefenin geç bir döneminden itibaren düşünüldüğünü görürüz. bazen bunları anlamak eziyet gibi gelsede buradan geçilmediği takdirde felsefi anlamda ilerlemenin ne olduğuna dair çok da bir sezgi kazanılamayacağını düşünmek gerek.
  
  ayrıca, yazdığı ilginç bir hususu da aktararak bitirelim:
  
  in view of this possibility, there are only two alternatives. one result could be utter negation and a life in ‘constant despair’, which excludes action, in a sort of schopenhauerian resignation. the other alternative is ‘affirmation’ of a world that is meaningful and replete, not with an illusory meaning, but with fulfilled, real sense. whence does ‘affirmation’ derive its force? this sense, since we cannot know that it in fact exists, can only be hoped for and demanded in the form of a moral ought. this unconditioned ought, husserl asserts, is found in the kantian categorical imperative as an absolute demand to action. given this ought, husserl concludes: ‘such a demand can only have meaning if i live; and if i live for it fully and absolutely, then i also believe, even if perhaps i am not clarifying this for myself, precisely because this belief is necessarily co-given [with this demand]. but when i reflect [upon these matters] i see: one [the belief] is impossible without the other [the demand]. if, however, i believe and become conscious of this belief, and enact it from this practical source freely, then it gives meaning to the world and to my life, gives the joyful confidence that nothing is in vain and all is for the good.’
  
  what husserl seems to say in this enigmatic passage is that viewing (cognitively!) the world as a meaningful whole is in itself a moral ought. while the insight into the presumptive nature of our world could lead to stemming from the moral ought, in which meaning is created through my belief in the moral law. it is, hence, the belief in a thoroughly and truly meaningful world that can save me from the existential despair into which i could fall given husserl’s transcendental idealism, according to which all cognition, and my entire culture, is only presumptive and potentially falsifiable. so it seems that husserl needs the hope for a meaningful world more desperately than anybody else! given the potentially bleak outlook on the meaninglessness of the world, one needs to feel the moral demand to fill this potential void.